

Market Work, Housework and Childcare: A Time Use Approach *

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Abstract

This paper construct a life-cycle model with home production and childcare constraints. The parameters of the childcare production function are estimated using micro evidence from U.S. time use data. We find that the model reproduces well observed life-cycle patterns in the time allocation across market, housework and childcare activities.

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1 Introduction

An important message in [Becker's \(1965\)](#) seminal paper is that in order to understand the full impact of policies on the economy, we should also examine their effects on non-market activities. Important, recent papers studying the allocation of womens' time include [Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu \(2005\)](#), [Attanasio, Low and Sanchez-Marcos \(2008\)](#) and [Jones, McGrattan and Manuelli \(2015\)](#). However, most studies on womens' labor market decisions ignore the role of childcare, and those that do typically treat childcare as exclusively a monetary cost. The implications of childcare has received little, if any, attention in the literature exploring the allocation of womens' time in a life-cycle setting. Yet childcare requirements constitute a substantial constraint on how women with children allocate their time. This lack of attention seems surprising since most of the increase in female participation is from married women. Further, as [Aguiar and Hurst \(2007\)](#) note, "there are certain elements of child rearing for which market goods and parental time are not good substitutes. This proposition is supported by the fact that hardly anyone uses market substitutes to raise their children completely. For this reason, we feel it appropriate to analyze childcare separately."

This paper develops a life-cycle model in which the time requirements of childcare are treated seriously. Since women often bear the brunt of childcare, the focus is on women – men are an exogenous source of income for the household. The data used to discipline our choices and to evaluate the model are from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) which is available since 2003. The ATUS data distinguishes between two types of childcare time. The first is *primary childcare time* which corresponds to time during which the primary activity of the survey respondent is taking care of a child. Included among such activities is bathing, feeding and reading to children. The second type of childcare time is *secondary childcare time* during which another activity, like housework or leisure, is the primary activity, but the respondent is nonetheless caring for a child. In order to focus on the role of the childcare constraint on the allocation of time, we take the childcare requirement as exogenous. In the model, this constraint can be satisfied through the choice of primary childcare time, secondary childcare time, and daycare. One contribution of this paper is the estimation of the parameters of the childcare production function, including the elasticity of substitution between primary and secondary childcare time using data from the American Time Use Surveys between 2003 and 2015.

As shown in [Section 5](#), childcare requirements differ markedly depending on both the number of children, and their age. So as to develop a reasonably parsimonious model, the length of a period is set to six years. Since older children can, to a large extent, take care of themselves, our focus, is on children under the age of twelve. Consequently, for the purposes

of the childcare constraint, what matters is the number of children under the age of six, and the number of children six to eleven years of age. Since women in their 40s have very few children, there are four model periods during which a woman can bear children (age groups 18-23, 24-29, 30-35 and 36-41), although the childcare requirement may continue into a fifth age group (42-47). We categorize the number of children (in each of the two child age groups) as being: zero, one, or two or more. As a result, there are 81 ($= 3^4$ where the 3 refers to the number of children that a woman can bear in each of her 4 model periods during which she is fertile) ‘types’ of women, depending on their fertility pattern. Women face no uncertainty over the timing of children: at the start of her life-cycle, each woman knows how many children she will bear, and at what ages she will bear them.

In the data, there are two chief sources of secondary childcare time: leisure and housework time. As is typical, households directly value leisure. Housework time is incorporated into the model by modeling home production as in [Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright \(1991\)](#) and [Greenwood and Hercowitz \(1991\)](#). More specifically, home produced goods require both housework time and durables.

Finally, the model features a hump-shaped profile for wages, the particulars of which are borrowed from [Gomme, Rogerson, Rupert and Wright \(2005\)](#), and womens’ wages are, on average, a fraction of mens’ wages. Market wages are important since they help determine the opportunity cost of both primary childcare time, as well as that of housework time.

The model is evaluated on its ability to replicate the allocation of time between working in the market, housework, primary childcare, and leisure. While some of the model’s parameters are calibrated to closely match the *average* allocation of time to these activities, the allocation of time over the life-cycle is not targeted and so constitutes an important test of the model. The model captures the way that time spent on primary childcare varies with a woman’s age. In particular, primary childcare time is high when women have many children – up to their mid-30s – after which primary childcare time drops off. The model also does well in mimicking the life-cycle pattern of leisure and housework time. While not a tight fit, the model nonetheless captures the general life-cycle pattern on womens’ market time. Specifically, this profile is somewhat hump-shaped with a peak around age 50. The model predicts too much time spent working for women aged 18-23. This age group was omitted by another study of the macroeconomics of childcare, [Attanasio *et al.* \(2008\)](#). We conjecture that including college-going in the model would reduce market work and help explain the youngest group. The model exaggerates somewhat the subsequent hump-shape to women’s market time. The model also overstates womens’ market time for women over the age of 65, likely due to omitting modeling retirement decisions in the model.

What is the role of childcare in this model? To answer this question, we look at the

behavior of women in the model who never have children. The chief difference between these women and the averages reported across all women in the model lies in the behavior of market time. The model predicts that women who never bear children have a profile for market time that is strictly declining with age, a pattern which simply does not match up with the hump-shaped profile observed in the ATUS data for all women. This observation shows that the role of childcare in the model is to cause a substitution of time out of market work into time activities to satisfy the childcare requirement – chiefly, primary childcare time. Childcare can also mute the effects of certain changes or policies. Secondary childcare, for example, can decrease the impact of a decline in the price of labor-saving durables as well as that of an increase in wages.¹ The latter would decrease leisure and time spent doing secondary childcare, which needs to be substituted by costly daycare which in turn decreases the benefits of higher wages.

To investigate the driving forces in the model, we run several counterfactuals: lower relative wages for women, a higher price of durables, and higher fertility. To ground these counterfactuals in reality, we look back roughly 50 years to the 1960s. At that time, women earned about 60% of what men earned, compared to 80% in the early 2000s. Not surprisingly, our model predicts that lowering women’s wages leads them to allocate less time to the market, and more time to housework, primary childcare, and leisure. This result is in accord with [Jones *et al.* \(2015\)](#). As described below, in the 2000s, the relative price of durables is normalized to one; in the 1960s, this relative price is roughly 2.8. When durables are more expensive, households purchase fewer of them, substituting into housework time. The model predicts a decline in market time – which fits with results in [Greenwood *et al.* \(2005\)](#).² Finally, higher fertility, as in the 1960s, increases childcare requirements. However, this change has little effect on market time, housework time or leisure. Instead, the chief effect of increased fertility is to increase both primary childcare time and the use of daycare. Evidently, women find it efficacious to maintain the amount of time allocated to market activity and purchase market daycare inputs.

In the public policy sphere, there has been some concern over the lower allocation of time to the market by younger women relative to men. One way to potentially boost the market time of younger women is to subsidize daycare. This public policy issue is addressed in the model by lowering the price of daycare. In response to a 25% decline in the price

¹[Dinkelman \(2011\)](#) examined the impact of rural household electrification on employment in South Africa. She found that the impact of changes in household technology on market work is larger for women in their 30s and 40s, and less important in areas with a higher percentage of young children.

²Recent empirical evidence also suggests that childcare constraints limited the impact of the household revolution. The model predicts a sizable decline in the use of daycare when durables are more expensive, reflecting the increase in secondary care time associated with higher housework time.

of daycare, the model predicts as much as a five-fold increase in the use of daycare. This experiment also raises the time spent by young women on market activity. One potential downside to this policy: the model predicts sharply lower primary childcare time. This last prediction is troubling in light of the documented importance of primary childcare time in child development. The recent empirical literature shows ambiguous effects of the expansion of subsidized child care. [Baker, Gruber and Milligan \(2008\)](#), for example, find that the expansion of universal subsidized child care in Quebec increased aggressiveness and decreased social and motor skills of children.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The related literature is discussed in Section 2. In Section 3 we examine data from the American Time Use Survey; in Section 4, we describe the model; in Section 5 we discuss the calibration of the model. Solving the model is difficult owing to the number of potentially non-binding constraints; see Section 6. In Section 7 we examine the results of the simulations. Section 8 concludes.

2 Related Literature

As previously mentioned, we are not the first to look at the time allocations of women. Broadly speaking, there have been two approaches. The first looks at the roles of relative wages and the price of durables, excluding the effects of childcare and fertility. [Greenwood *et al.* \(2005\)](#) build a life-cycle model with home production and a durables adoption decision. They find that the durable goods revolution is the prime driver of changes in womens' market time and that its effects are roughly three times those of changes in relative wages. [Jones *et al.* \(2015\)](#) use a home production model more similar to ours. Since 1950, they find that most of the increase in womens' market time is due to increases in the relative wage; changes in the price of durables play only a small role. Our results are consistent with those of [Jones *et al.*](#) in that we do not find large effects associated with the declining price of durables.

The second approach combines rising wages of women with childcare (thus ignoring the durable goods revolution) and analyzes the latter part of the 20th century; see, for example, [Attanasio *et al.* \(2008\)](#). They too use a life-cycle model with exogenous fertility to examine the role of childcare on market work. An important difference relative to our work is that they consider the pecuniary cost of childcare while we look at the time dimension. [Attanasio *et al.*](#) find that a combination of higher wages and lower daycare costs can explain the changes in womens' market time since 1950. While they do an admirable job in mustering evidence in favor of a fall in the price of daycare, the evidence is not clear cut. Our model provides an alternative interpretation of this time period in which higher wages and lower prices of durables account for the rise in womens' market time. Simulating our model with

lower daycare costs as in [Attanasio *et al.*](#), our model predicts an implausibly large decline in primary childcare time; see Section 7.1. [Olivetti \(2006\)](#) attributes the rise in womens' market time between the 1970s and 1990s to increases in the returns to work experience. Her model also implies a large decline in maternal care which, if we think of 'maternal care' as corresponding to primary childcare time, has not been observed (see Section 3). If, instead, maternal childcare is understood to include secondary childcare time, then our model provides a means to square [Olivetti's](#) results with the data. Prior to the ATUS, secondary childcare time is not well measured. Nonetheless, it is plausible that secondary childcare time has fallen since its two chief components, leisure and housework, have declined. Thus, our distinction between primary and secondary childcare time can help reconcile results like those of [Olivetti](#) with the available facts.

[Fernndez \(2013\)](#) and [Fogli and Veldkamp \(2011\)](#) provide alternative explanations for the changes in womens' allocation of time. [Fernndez](#) finds that societal changes in the attitudes towards women have quantitatively important effects on womens' decisions to work. In [Fogli and Veldkamp](#) a woman's decision to work or not is affected by whether women nearby were working or not when she was a child. They find results consistent with observed geographic patterns.

Like us, [Knowles \(2013\)](#) examines the intra-household allocation of market time using the ATUS to assess the ability of the model to reproduce time spent on market work, leisure and home production. The home good is produced using time-inputs of the married couple. He finds that the increase in the relative wage of women over the second part of the century can explain all of the increase in married womens hours over the period but not the decline in marriage rates over the same period.³ [Knowles](#) does not model childcare. Similar results are found by [Fernndez and Wong \(2014\)](#) who develop a quantitative life-cycle model to examine the role of divorce and increased wages on married womens' labor force participation. They include childcare costs in the household budget constraint.

[Gelber and Mitchell \(2012\)](#), examine the impact of income tax policies on the labor supply of single women and of men. They look at not only the impact of tax policies on market work, but also on non-market activities. They find that a reduction in income taxes has a large impact on market work for single women, significantly reduces their time spent doing housework, and has no change in time spent with children. [Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura \(2012\)](#) examine the effects of tax changes on married couples with children. They find a larger effect for couples with children than for couples without children. In their model, childcare is a market good; they do not consider the time implications of childcare. Recently,

³Like us, [Knowles](#) finds that the decline in the price of labor-saving technologies plays a minor role on time allocations.

Bick (2012) develops a life-cycle model that distinguishes between paid and unpaid childcare. He finds that a lack of subsidized child care can decrease participation and fertility.

Domeij and Klein (2013) find that subsidies to daycares financed by distortionary taxation increase welfare by encouraging women with children to work. They conclude, though, that they have not examined the effects of increased daycare on child welfare as they do not model a childcare production function.

3 Historical Facts: Female Labor Force, Housework and Childcare

This section uses data from the U.S. Census and U.S. time use surveys to examine trends in married women's market work, housework, childcare and leisure. The term married woman is used as a shorthand to include not only married women but also women with a domestic partner.

Figure 1a reports the observed changes in the allocation of time of married women to market work over the second half of the twentieth century. The data come from the 1965 Time Use Surveys (TUS) and the 2006 American Time Use Survey (ATUS). Figure 1a suggests that on average, married women allocate less time to market work in 1965 than in 2006 in their prime childbearing years. In 1965, married women in the age bracket 24-29 spent 89.97 minutes a day in market work versus 163.08 minutes spent by married women in the 42-47 age bracket. In 2006, these figures were 198.88 and 236.88 minutes (the figures for 2006 are reported in Table 1).

Figure 1b shows changes in primary childcare over the life-cycle and across the two time-use surveys. The micro data do not reveal large changes in the amount of time spent on primary childcare between 1965 and 2006. However, women 36 to 42 years old devote almost 30 more minutes in primary childcare in 2006 than in 1965 and overall for women 18 to 47 years old, primary childcare increases from 375 minutes a day to 444 minutes a day.

Figure 1c shows marked declines in housework between 1965 and 2006. For women in the age group 24-29, housework fell from 283.63 minutes a day in 1965 to 136.73 minutes in 2006. The decline was similar for other age groups. On average, married women were spending 276.79 minutes a day in housework in 1965 versus 163.09 in 2006. While housework declined sharply after 1965, in principle, the supervision of a child required the same number of hours.⁴ One concern with interpreting the decline in housework as time freed for either leisure or market work is that part of housework time was spent in providing child supervision

⁴It is possible that with less time spent on housework, childcare standards increased and more time is now spent supervising children than in the first half of the century.

in the form of secondary care. Unfortunately the information we have from the earlier time use surveys cannot be compared to the information collected in the more recent ATUS.

Since 2003 the ATUS has collected information about time spent during which a respondent had a household child under 13 in “his/her care” but is doing something else as a primary activity. The child need not be in the same room.⁵ In addition, if the respondent reports providing both primary and secondary childcare, the time is attributed to primary care only. In the earlier time use surveys, when respondents reported that they were engaged in secondary childcare, they were then asked “what else were you doing?” As a result, respondents may have under-reported passive supervision of children making it difficult to directly compare secondary childcare time from the earlier time use surveys with the more recent ATUS. The ATUS reports much higher estimates of secondary childcare than previous time use surveys, suggesting that the question asked across the various time use surveys captured different notions of secondary childcare, with less passive child supervision captured in the earlier surveys.⁶ For these reasons our figures report secondary childcare only for the 2006 survey but primary childcare for all four surveys. For both primary and secondary childcare,⁷ we use only information about the respondent’s own child/children and/or their spouse’s child/children.

Table 1 reports for 2006 how many minutes per day married women spent on personal care, leisure, market work, housework, primary and secondary childcare.⁸ It shows that married women spend almost three times more time on secondary childcare than doing primary childcare.

Figure 1c plots the total time married women spent on household chores while Figure 1d

⁵The time individuals spend providing secondary childcare to household children is restricted to the time starting when the first household member under the age of 13 woke up and ending when the last household child under 13 went to bed. It is also restricted to times when the respondent was awake.

⁶Allard, Bianchi, Stewart and Wright (2007) describe the different measures of secondary childcare used in the surveys. They also compare the data from the 2003-2004 ATUS on primary and secondary childcare with the 2000 National Survey of Parents (NSP) conducted by the Survey Center at the University of Maryland. This is the most recent time-diary study that collects data on secondary activities. The NSP information about primary childcare is remarkably close to the information obtained from the 2003-2004 ATUS, but for secondary childcare the NSP reports much lower figures. Again, the difference is the more passive notion of childcare used in ATUS which aims at capturing the idea that the respondents may be doing something else, in a different room, not with the child, but nearby, with the knowledge of what the child is doing and capable of intervening if necessary. For primary childcare, however, the notion used in the different surveys provides very similar estimates.

⁷For secondary childcare we use the information under the flag `trthh_ln`


⁸The ATUS codes for personal care are: `tutier1code=01`; for leisure: `tutier1code==12`; for market work: `work (tutier1code=05) + travel to work (tutier1code=18 + tutier2code=05)`; for housework: `household activities (tutier1code=02)`; total housework `housework + consumer purchases (tutier1code = 07, tutier2code=01+02+03)+ travel to make purchases (tutier1code=18, tutier2code=07)+ phone calls (tutier1code=16, tutier2code=01, tutier3code=04)`; for primary childcare: `household children tutier1code=03, (tutier2code=01 + tutier2code=02 + tutier2code=03)`.

Table 1: From the 2006 ATUS: Married Women Allocation of Time

Age	Observations	Personal Care	Leisure	Market Work	Housework	Housework (broad)
18-23	71	620.75	243.51	112.64	140.09	159.01
24-29	321	571.50	218.52	198.88	136.73	163.55
30-35	605	552.74	215.41	190.54	154.17	185.5
36-41	644	545.59	196.85	222.27	154.92	187.48
42-47	579	551.23	214.77	236.88	168.23	197.42
48-53	407	551.13	251.52	245.13	166.80	193.54
54-59	320	568.04	248.10	215.52	164.13	193.08
60-65	224	556.86	309.43	164.39	162.67	186.54
66-71	163	579.61	356.40	26.60	218.56	245.14
72-78	113	577.36	403.07	31.92	184.73	208.77
18-78	3447	559.94	248.08	191.75	163.09	191.31

Age	Observations	Primary Childcare	Secondary Childcare (total)	Secondary Childcare (with housework)	Secondary Childcare (with broad housework)	Secondary Childcare (with leisure)
18-23	71	97.30	377.00	101.00	108.50	140.70
24-29	321	104.72	302.23	87.64	103.12	92.54
30-35	605	110.20	357.30	103.96	120.62	107.27
36-41	644	89.53	309.47	84.19	97.65	82.63
42-47	579	42.27	172.81	53.10	58.63	53.20
48-53	407	13.41	49.40	16.16	17.91	13.25
54-59	320	2.86	15.60	4.41	5.00	3.62
60-65	224	2.75	5.11	0.84	0.89	2.21
66-71	163	0.52	4.64	0.97	0.97	1.85
72-78	113	0.0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
18-78	3447	49.15	166.47	47.9	139.53	49.38

Figure 1: Married Females: Allocation of Time (Time Use Surveys)



disaggregates, for 2006, secondary childcare time into its chief components (secondary childcare time while doing housework, and while enjoying leisure). Two measures of housework are used: one includes standard activities (code 02), while “total housework” also includes time spent purchasing groceries, food and gas, including time spent traveling and making phone calls related to purchases of consumption goods (see Table 1). These figures show that a considerable fraction of secondary childcare is done while mothers do household chores, particularly for married women younger than 41, and confirm the importance of the link between housework and childcare.

Figure 1d also shows secondary childcare while enjoying leisure. Both types of secondary childcare (joint with housework and with leisure) are of similar magnitude, each about a third of total secondary childcare. The other third of secondary childcare, which is not included as part of secondary childcare in our model and simulations, was done when the primary activity was some other activity such as grooming, eating a meal, or studying.⁹

To recap, the evidence shows that there has been an increase in time allocated to primary childcare over the second half of the twentieth century. High quality data on secondary childcare time is only available since 2003 (ATUS); this data shows that roughly a third of secondary childcare time occurs when women are performing household tasks, and a third

⁹For example, in the 2006 ATUS survey a woman between the ages of 30 and 35 spent 39.84 minutes per day supervising the kids while eating a meal, and 26.88 minutes while the primary activity was traveling.

when they are enjoying leisure. Figure 1 reveal a marked increase in market work and a decrease in housework by married women since the 1960s. The implications of these uses of time on the life-cycle pattern of womens' time allocations are explored below.

4 Economic Environment

4.1 Households

The economy is populated by overlapping generations of households. As discussed in the Introduction, households differ with respect to their fertility patterns. There is no uncertainty with regards to fertility: a household knows how many children it will have, and when. The index j is used to distinguish between households of different fertility patterns; for a given fertility pattern, households are otherwise identical.

Households are comprised of a married couple which splits its time among market work, housework, secondary and primary childcare, and leisure. While men always work a fixed number of hours, the household chooses how much women work. As in other studies of womens' time allocation (see Section 2), women earn a fraction of what men earn. A household of type j 'formed' at date t has preferences summarized by

$$\sum_{i=0}^{T-1} \beta^i U(c_{mj}^i, c_{hj}^i, \ell_j^i) \quad (1)$$

where T is the 'lifetime' of the household, c denotes consumption, ℓ leisure, i superscripts refer to the *age* of the household, m subscripts pertain to *market* variables, and h subscripts indicate *home work* activities. Thus, c_{mj}^i is market consumption of household type j at age i . The functional form for U is:

$$U(c_m, c_h, \ell) = \begin{cases} \ln C(c_m, c_h) + \omega \ln \ell & \text{if } \gamma = 1 \\ \frac{[C(c_m, c_h)\ell^\omega]^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} & \text{if } \gamma \in (0, 1) \cup (1, \infty) \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

where $C(c_m, c_h)$ is a consumption aggregator:

$$C(c_m, c_h) = \begin{cases} c_m^\psi c_h^{1-\psi} & \text{if } \xi = 0 \\ [\psi c_m^\xi + (1-\psi)c_h^\xi]^{1/\xi} & \text{if } \xi \in (-\infty, 0) \cup (0, 1). \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

Home goods, c_{hj}^i , are produced by combining durables, d^i , with time, n_h^i :

$$c_{hj}^i = H(d_j^i, n_{hj}^i) \quad (4)$$

where

$$H(d, n_h) = \begin{cases} d^\eta n_h^{1-\eta} & \text{if } \zeta = 0 \\ \left[\eta d^\zeta + (1-\eta)n_h^\zeta \right]^{1/\zeta} & \text{if } \zeta \in (-\infty, 0) \cup (0, 1). \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

A key feature of the model is the childcare production function and constraint:

$$G(n_{pj}^i, n_{hj}^i, \ell_j^i, s_j^i) \geq c_{cj}^i \quad (6)$$

where

$$G(n_p, n_h, \ell, s) = \begin{cases} n_p^\nu (n_s + s)^{1-\nu} & \text{if } \varphi = 0 \\ \left[\nu n_p^\varphi + (1-\nu)(n_s + s)^\varphi \right]^{1/\varphi} & \text{if } \varphi \in (-\infty, 0) \cup (0, 1) \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

is the childcare production function which takes as inputs *primary* childcare time (n_p), *secondary* childcare time (n_s), and purchased daycare services (s). Secondary childcare time and daycare are assumed to be perfect substitutes. Secondary childcare is a fraction of leisure time, ℓ , and housework time, n_h :

$$n_s = \theta_\ell \ell + \theta_h n_h. \quad (8)$$

Childcare is a constraint in that a household of type j , aged i *must* provide total childcare services of c_{cj}^i ; the household does not directly value the provision of these childcare services. These services, in turn, are produced either with primary childcare time, n_{pj}^i , or a secondary input (either secondary childcare time, n_{sj}^i , or daycare, s_j^i). Consequently, when there are children in the household, home work time, n_{hj}^i , produces two distinct goods: home consumption goods, c_{hj}^i , and childcare, c_{cj}^i .

The household's budget constraint is

$$c_{mj}^i + qd_j^i + ps_j^i + a_j^{i+1} = \bar{n}w^i + \phi n_{mj}^i w^i + ra_j^i \quad (9)$$

where d_j^i represents purchases of durables by a household of type j at age i , a_j^i denotes this household's beginning-of-period market assets, \bar{n} is the (fixed) amount of time that the husband works, w^i is the real wage (assumed to be age-dependent), ϕ^i is the efficiency of the wife relative to the husband, r is the gross return on capital, q is the price of durables and p is the price of daycare. It is assumed that the price of daycare is a fraction ρ of the wife's wage: $p = \rho\phi^i w$.

The household faces a constraint on the *wife's* time,

$$n_{mj}^i + n_{hj}^i + n_{pj}^i + \ell_j^i = \tilde{T} \quad (10)$$

where \tilde{T} is the time endowment. Notice that secondary childcare time does not appear in

the time constraint since it is a byproduct of leisure and housework time.

There are a number of non-negativity constraints in the model. The important ones are on the allocations of time and purchases of daycare services. As well, a woman cannot work more than a ‘standard’ work week. These constraints are:

$$0 \leq n_{mj}^i \leq \bar{n}, \quad n_{hj}^i \geq 0, \quad n_{pj}^i \geq 0, \quad \ell_j^i \geq 0, \quad s_j^i \geq 0. \quad (11)$$

The household faces the following boundary conditions:

$$a_t^0 = 0, \quad a_t^{T+1} \geq 0 \quad (12)$$

That is, the household starts with no real assets, and it ends with non-negative holdings of real assets.

The problem of the household is to maximize Eq. (1) subject to Eqs. (4), (6) and (9)–(12), taking as given prices.

4.2 Firms

Firms face the usual static problem of maximizing period-by-period profits, viz.

$$\max_{\{K, N\}} K^\alpha N^{1-\alpha} - \tilde{r}K - wN$$

where K is capital, N the labor input, \tilde{r} the real rental rate of capital, and w the real wage. The relationship between \tilde{r} , above, and r in the household’s problem is:

$$r = \tilde{r} + 1 - \delta.$$

4.3 Market Clearing Conditions

Capital market clearing is given by

$$K = \sum_j \sum_{i=0}^{T-1} f_j a_j^i.$$

where f_j is the fraction of type j households. The right-hand side adds up, over fertility patterns and age, the market assets of all households.

Let e^i denote the ‘efficiency’ in market production of an individual of age i . Then, labor market clearing is

$$N = \sum_j f_j \left[\sum_{i=0}^{T-1} e^i (\bar{n} + \phi^i n_{mj}^i) \right].$$

Recall that male labor supply is constant at \bar{n} .

Finally, goods market clearing is written

$$\sum_j f_j \left[\sum_{i=0}^{T-1} (c_{mj}^i + qd_j^i + ps_j^i) \right] + \delta K = K^\alpha N^{1-\alpha}$$

5 Calibration

Functional forms are given by Eqs. (2), (3), (5) and (7). The model's parameters are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2: Parameter Values

Time		
	Length of a period (years)	6
	Number of periods of 'life'	10
\tilde{T}	Time endowment (minutes per day)	680
Market production		
α	Capital's share	0.33
δ	Depreciation rate of market capital (annual)	0.07
Utility		
ω	Weight on leisure in utility function	0.2585
β	Discount factor (annual)	0.9755
Consumption aggregator		
ψ	Weight on market consumption	0.7508
ξ	CES parameter	-0.3
Home production		
η	Weight on durables	0.5229
ζ	CES parameter	0.35
q	Price of durables	1
Childcare		
ν	Weight on primary childcare time	0.58347
φ	CES parameter	0.75715
θ_ℓ		0.6
θ_h		0.8
ρ	cost of childcare as a fraction of wages	0.6

To start, a model period is set to 6 years. This choice is motivated by the observation that children tend to start school at age 6, and that their childcare requirement may change upon entering school. The household 'lives' for 10 periods, or 60 years. In data terms, we are looking at households for which the respondent is aged between 18 and 78.

A number of the model's parameters are standard, and hopefully require little discussion. These parameters include: α , capital's share of income; δ , the depreciation rate of market capital. The depreciation rate is consistent with results reported in [Gomme and Rupert \(2007\)](#). The price of durables, q is normalized to 1. Time spent working by men, \bar{n} , is 320 minutes per day (a 7.5 hour work day, 5 days a week). \bar{n} is also the maximum amount of time that a woman can work in the market. The market efficiency profiles, $\{e^i\}$, are taken from [Gomme *et al.* \(2005\)](#).

Perhaps the most problematic parameters are those characterizing the childcare production function. To understand how these parameters are set, consider the problem when there is only one level of childcare, regardless of the number or ages of the children. Assuming that the constraint Eq. (6) holds with equality and focusing on women who use no daycare services, the estimating equation is

$$y = [\nu n_{p_i}^\varphi + (1 - \nu)n_{s_i}^\varphi]^{1/\varphi} + \epsilon_i$$

where \hat{i} indexes households and ϵ_i is an error term. Since the level of childcare is, by assumption, constant, this amounts to fitting the parameters of the childcare production function to a given isoquant (the same level of childcare, but different combinations of primary and secondary childcare) which allows us to determine y , the level of childcare. To turn the equation into a more conventional formulation, rewrite it as

$$0_N = y - [\nu n_{p_i}^\varphi + (1 - \nu)n_{s_i}^\varphi]^{1/\varphi} + \epsilon_i.$$

where N is the number of observations. It may seem odd that the dependent variable is the constant vector 0_N , but this is what the theory tell us to do.¹⁰

Of course, it is likely that childcare requirements will differ depending on the number of children of different ages. Let \hat{j} be a counter for the number of children less than 6 years of age (with a top code of 2 children), and \hat{j}' be a counter for the number of children aged 6-11. Under the assumption that the share and curvature parameters are the same across households, the task is to estimate a collection of $y_{\hat{j}\hat{j}'}$ s along with ν and φ via

$$0_N = \sum_{\hat{j}=0,1,2} \sum_{\hat{j}'=0,1,2} I_{\hat{j}\hat{j}'} \left\{ y_{\hat{j}\hat{j}'} - [\nu n_{p_i}^\varphi + (1 - \nu)n_{s_i}^\varphi]^{1/\varphi} \right\} + \epsilon_i$$

where $I_{\hat{j}\hat{j}'}$ is an indicator function equal to 1 when a household has \hat{j} children under the age of 6 and \hat{j}' children aged 6-11. Implicitly, households with no children under the age of 12 are discarded. Now, the task is to estimate a family of isoquants where the level of childcare

¹⁰We are grateful to Angelo Melino for pointing out this estimation strategy.

required varies by the age and number of children. In fact, our identifying assumption for the $y_{j\hat{j}}$'s is that all households with \hat{j} children under the age of 6 and j' children aged 6-11 must provide the *same* level of childcare.

Recall that in developing this estimating equation, it was assumed that the household purchases no daycare. This is because the ATUS does not report the use of daycare. Consequently, for the purposes of estimation, the sample is further restricted to women who do not work and so are unlikely to actually use daycare.¹¹

Table 3: Childcare Production Function Estimates

Parameter	Estimate	Standard Error
y_{01}	176.72578	2.36865
y_{02}	196.20960	2.55648
y_{10}	245.12563	1.87904
y_{11}	239.67693	2.34848
y_{12}	249.89332	3.39079
y_{20}	268.38311	2.28837
y_{21}	273.40611	3.90951
y_{22}	274.47051	6.14538
ν	0.54919	0.00464
φ	0.60410	0.01824

The parameter estimates are summarized in Table 3. All of the parameters are fairly tightly estimated. What is most important is that the CES parameter, φ , implies a fair deal of substitutability between primary and secondary childcare. In other words, households will find it relatively easy to substitute, say, from primary to secondary childcare in order to satisfy their childcare requirement.¹²

Feeding these estimates into the model is, at this point, fairly straightforward. Since the number of children of a particular age is either 0, 1 or 2+, and since women can bear children only in the first four periods of their life-cycle, it follows that there are 81 ($= 3^4$) fertility patterns. As discussed earlier, it is assumed that a household knows upon its formation how many children it will have, and at what age. The childcare requirement in the model c_{cj}^i simply needs to be looked up in Table 3.

Recall from Eq. (8) that secondary childcare time, n_s^i , is the sum of a fraction θ_ℓ of leisure time and a fraction θ_h of housework time. It is assumed that these fractions are constant:

¹¹In principle, we should be using primary and secondary childcare time for the household, not just the wife. Unfortunately, as discussed earlier, the ATUS only collects time use data for the respondent, not the household.

¹²We have, in addition, allowed the parameters ν and φ to differ with the number and age of children. The resulting set of parameter estimates are quite close to those estimated restricting these parameters to be the same across households.

they do not vary with the age of the woman, nor with the age or number of children. The fractions are taken to roughly match observations from the ATUS data and are as reported in Table 2. The *weighted average* childcare requirement is reported in Figure 2f. The average requirement initially rises, reflecting both the greater fertility of women 24-29 relative to those 18-23, and the fact that women 18-23 have no older children. The childcare requirement after age 35 falls quickly due to the lower birth rates among older women.

For durables to be labor-saving, durables and housework time have to be fairly substitutable. Hence we set the CES elasticity of substitutions in the home production $\zeta = 0.35$ which implies more substitutability than Cobb-Douglas. This value for ζ is in the range estimated by McGrattan, Rogerson and Wright (1997) and Rupert, Rogerson and Wright (1995). Consider, instead, the setup in Greenwood *et al.* (2005). There, market time is indivisible, hours and durables are perfect complements (the home production function is Leontief), durables are indivisible, and by assumption, adopting the latest vintage of durables increases the productivity of housework time in a labor-embodied fashion. As the price of durables falls, a household eventually adopts the newest vintage of durables. While their model is quite suitable for analyzing the household durable adoption decision, our model is more appropriate for comparing the allocation of time between market work, housework, childcare and leisure.

The elasticity of substitution between market and home goods plays an important role in the analysis. As Jones *et al.* (2015) show, when market and home goods are good substitutes, improvements in home technologies induces a decrease in market hours; only when the two goods are highly complementary will market hours increase. Empirical evidence in McGrattan *et al.* (1997) and Rupert *et al.* (1995) suggest, instead, that home and market goods are substitutes, which implies that improvements in home technologies will decrease female market hours. As in Jones *et al.* (2015) we assume complementarity between the two goods so that improvements in home technology generate a positive effect on female market work. While Jones *et al.* (2015) set $\xi = -0.75$, which implies an elasticity of substitution between home and market goods equal to 0.57, we assume slightly more substitutability by setting $\xi = -0.3$ (an elasticity of 0.74).

The time endowment, \tilde{T} , requires some discussion. In the business cycle literature, the usual practice is to set the time endowment to discretionary time: total time less sleeping and personal grooming. In the business cycle model, this discretionary time is then split between working and leisure. Since there are no time series on aggregate leisure, the business cycle literature is not particularly interested in leisure per se. However, as shown in Table 1, what the business cycle researcher calls leisure is, in fact, a mix of many activities, only a small portion of which is leisure. If we took the total time endowment (1440 minutes per day),

subtracted off personal care (from the ATUS, about 560 minutes per day), and matched the profiles for market work, housework and primary childcare time, then the model would predict far too much leisure time since, on average, women spend about 200 minutes per day on other activities. For the model, it is important to get leisure right since it is one of the inputs to secondary childcare. In order for the model to have a chance at matching the observed life-cycle profiles, we treat this ‘extra’ 200 minutes per day as non-discretionary time. Alternatively, we can compute \tilde{T} as the sum of average market time, housework time, primary childcare time, and leisure. Doing so gives a value of about 680 for \tilde{T} . Defining discretionary time in this fashion simply gives the model an opportunity to get average time allocations right, not the life-cycle patterns.

The remaining parameters are: ω , the weight on leisure in utility; β , the discount factor; ρ , the cost of daycare as a fraction of a woman’s wage; ψ , the weight on market consumption in the consumption aggregator; and η , the weight on durables in the home production function. These parameters are chosen to roughly match the following observations:

1. From the ATUS, married women aged 18-64 worked, on average, 195.7 minutes per day.
2. From the ATUS, married women on average performed 192.02 minutes of housework.
3. From the ATUS, married women aged 18-47 report spending an average of 88.1 minutes on primary childcare.
4. The durables share of output is 10.14%.
5. An annual real interest rate of 4%.

5.1 Population Shares

In the model, there are 81 household types that differ by completed fertility pattern (the number of children born in each household age group). What weights should be attached to these types? Vital statistics data provides information on the age of a woman and birth order (that is, for a woman of a particular age, the fraction having their first, second, etc. child). This data is insufficient to construct the required completed fertility patterns.

Census data is more promising since it reports the number of children in each household. Completed fertility can be inferred by looking at women aged, say, 42 and counting up the number of children aged 0-5, 6-11, 12-17 and 18-23. However, older children may have moved out of the household, leading to under-counting of children aged 18-23 (and so the number of children born to the woman when she was 18-23). Fortunately, the 1990 (and earlier)

Census also reports the total number of children borne by a woman, and this information can be used to better infer the number of older children.

We used the Census data to give general fertility patterns. Consider a woman aged 18-23 who has one child (under 6), we need to know the likelihood of various combinations of subsequent child births. It is more likely that her next child is born when she is in the 24-29 age group than the 36-41 group. This is the information obtained from the Census data. For such a woman (who has one child when she is 18-23), there are 27 such combinations; thus, there are 81 combinations when one considers that an 18-23 year old can have 0, 1 or 2+ children.

So that the shares of women with young children match up with the ATUS data, the shares obtained from Census are adjusted to match up with the observed shares in the ATUS. Consequently, there is no single set of weights that is used to construct the model's counterparts to the ATUS time allocations. This procedure takes as given the ATUS data (including the demographic weights) and adjust the model's output so that the demographics of the model better match the fertility patterns observed in the ATUS data.

6 Solving the Model

There are a number of features in the model that make it difficult to solve using standard techniques, meaning solving sets of non-linear Euler equations and constraints. First, the fact that secondary childcare time and daycare services are perfect substitutes means that the non-negativity constraint on daycare sometimes binds. Second, there is sufficient substitutability between primary childcare time and secondary childcare that the non-negativity constraint on primary childcare time sometimes binds. These two problems are exacerbated by the fact that secondary childcare time is a 'cast off' of other activities, namely housework time and leisure. Third, the substitutability between durables and housework time mean that the non-negativity constraint on housework time may also bind. Finally, the inequality constraint on childcare may bind, particularly later in a woman's life-cycle when secondary childcare time may be more than sufficient to satisfy this constraint.

While a number of approaches were taken to solving the model, in the end a brute force maximization of lifetime utility subject to the various constraints and non-negativity constraints did the trick, with one modification: the Euler equations for asset and durables accumulation were included among the constraints.¹³ In a sense, including these Euler equations amounts to blending a straight maximization of lifetime utility with solving Euler equations. The reason for including these Euler equations is that while the solution algorithm

¹³The actual optimization code (with inequality constraints) is due to [Schittkowski \(1985/86\)](#).

performed well in finding solutions for ‘static’ variables (‘well’ in the sense that these variables fit their relevant Euler equations), the same could not be said for the ‘dynamic’ variables.

7 Results of the Simulations

In this section we examine how well the model performs with regards to the life-cycle profiles for the allocation of time as reported in the ATUS.


7.1 Life-cycle Patterns

Time allocations for the model and ATUS are reported in Figure 2. Recall that by construction, the model matches *average* market, housework and primary childcare time – but not necessarily the life-cycle patterns. That said, the childcare requirement reported in Figure 2f certainly influences the life-cycle pattern of primary childcare time, although model households are free to choose the mix of primary versus secondary childcare time (or daycare) used to satisfy this childcare requirement. Apart from early and late in the life-cycle, the model’s predictions for market time generally line up well with the data. Specifically, the data displays a hump-shaped pattern, peaking around age 50. Apart from the 18-23 age group, the model predicts a similar, albeit exaggerated, pattern. The model’s under-prediction for market time of women aged 24-35 may be due to overstating the cost of daycare for which there is simply very little information available. For example, [Cardia and Ng \(2003\)](#), using the 1992 release of the Health and Retirement Survey, find that 42.5% of households with at least one child and grandchild spent more than 100 hours per year caring for grandchildren. Presumably, these women receive this family help with childcare at low or zero cost.

The model predicts that women aged 18-23 work more than they actually do. This group spends more time on education than the older age groups which suggests that including education in the model would improve the model’s predictions for market time for the youngest group. Also recall that [Attanasio *et al.* \(2008\)](#) exclude this age group in their analysis, perhaps reflecting its problematic nature. The model also over-predicts market time for women over the age of 65; incorporating retirement would, no doubt, help the model on this dimension.

To assess the role of childcare in the model, Figure 2 also reports life-cycle profiles for the group of women who never have children. Whereas the ATUS exhibits a hump-shaped pattern for market time, women who never have children have a life-cycle pattern that declines monotonically with age. This result shows that the role of childcare in our model is to reduce time allocated to market work for younger women – those who bear children. As


Figure 2: Model versus ATUS



Note: Solid black lines: ATUS data; dashed black lines: benchmark model; solid gray lines: women with no children.

these women bear children, they must allocate time to their care. Looking across the time allocations, one can see that childcare works primarily by shifting time from market work to primary childcare time – leisure and housework time are little affected by fertility, despite their importance in providing secondary childcare time.

Figure 3: Model Counter-Factuals



Note: Solid black lines: benchmark model; dashed black lines: 1965 price of durables; solid gray lines: 1965 relative wage; dashed gray lines: 1965 fertility.

To understand the driving forces in the model, Figure 3 presents results for a number of counter-factual experiments. To discipline the nature of these counter-factuals, look back roughly 50 years to conditions in the 1960s. Then, the relative price of durables was roughly 2.8 times higher than in the 2000s; women earned about 60% of what men earned, compared to 80% today; and fertility was higher, reflecting the effects of the post-World War II baby boom.¹⁴

¹⁴While the benchmark model's calibration requires solving for general equilibrium, the counter-factual experiments are partial equilibrium.

A higher price of durables leads households to purchase fewer durables, as in [Greenwood *et al.* \(2005\)](#). Indeed, the durables share of output falls from 10% in the benchmark model to 2.8%. Since the elasticity of substitution in the home production function implies that durables are labor-saving devices, the fall in durables is accompanied by an increased allocation of time to housework. The increase in housework time is accommodated chiefly through a reduction in market time. This decline in market time is substantial: on average, market time falls by 40 minutes per day, which represents a 20% decline. As shown in [Figures 3b and 3c](#), there is little effect on either primary childcare time or leisure. The increased housework time translates into more secondary childcare time; households can, then, reduce their purchases of daycare, as shown in [Figure 3f](#).

Lowering the relative wage of women also reduces their market time, in this case by 55 minutes per day (30%). In the face of lower market compensation, women substitute into housework, leisure and primary childcare. As a result, use of daycare collapses; see [Figure 3f](#).

Finally, increasing fertility to its 1960s levels has remarkably little effect on those uses of time that contribute to secondary childcare, leisure and housework. Instead, women react through a combination of increased primary childcare time and use of daycare. The small effect on market time suggests that women find it preferable to continue working, purchasing more daycare for their children.

Overall, these counterfactuals point to the complex interaction of economic forces within our model. Changes in housework time and leisure have knock-on effects operating through the fact that they are inputs to the production of childcare. In other words, one must look beyond the straightforward market-versus-home margins that are present in the works of [Greenwood *et al.* \(2005\)](#) or [Jones *et al.* \(2015\)](#). All three counterfactuals favor the home sector over the market sector, yet only two, the lower relative wage of women and higher price of durables, lead to lower women's market time.

Overall, the model's predictions for the allocation of women's time between market work, housework, leisure and children line up reasonably well with the 2006 time use survey.


Cheaper Daycare

What are the effects of cheaper daycare? This is an issue that has received some attention in public policy circles. Indeed, in 1997 the province of Québec in Canada implemented a policy of heavily subsidized daycare. Here, the experiment is to reduce the price of daycare by 25% – a substantial decline in its price, but far short of that enacted in Québec.


This policy leads to roughly a three-fold increase in the use of daycare. While there is a relatively small decrease in secondary childcare time (meaning leisure and housework time), the chief effects on the allocation of time are a reallocation of from primary childcare (a

Figure 4: Cheaper Daycare


(a) Market Time




(b) Primary Childcare Time




(c) Leisure




(d) Housework Time



(e) Secondary Childcare Time



(f) Daycare Services



reduction of 37 minutes, or 38%) to working in the market (21 minutes, or 12%).

The results of this cheaper daycare experiment cast some doubt on [Attanasio *et al.*'s \(2008\)](#) explanation for the observed increase in womens' market time. Specifically, they attribute the increase between the 1970s and 1990s to a combination of an increase in the relative wage of women and lower price of daycare; the increase in relative wages alone is insufficient. Yet, given our model's predictions for the response of primary childcare time to the price of daycare – a dimension overlooked by [Attanasio *et al.*](#) – along with the the very small observed changes in womens' primary childcare time reported in [Figure 1b](#) suggests that [Attanasio *et al.*'s](#) cheaper daycare explanation for the increase in womens' market time comes at the cost of a counter-factual decline in their primary childcare time.

8 Conclusions

This paper constructed a life-cycle model of the allocation of womens' time that includes the time cost of childcare. While the calibration matched the average allocation of time to the market, housework and primary childcare, households within the model were free to determine the life-cycle patterns of their time allocations. The paper made a number of contributions. First was the estimation of the parameters of the childcare production function, including; the weight on primary versus secondary childcare; the share parameter on these inputs; and the actual childcare requirements by age and number of children.

Second, incorporating the time dimension of childcare was shown to improve the model's predictions for the life-cycle allocation of time. In particular, in the data, the age profile of womens' market time is hump-shaped; the benchmark model predicts a similar pattern. In contrast, women in the model who never have children exhibit a profile for market time that is monotonically declining with age.

Third, we showed that the increase in the relative wage of women between the 1960s and early 2000s has important effects of womens' market time, but not their primary childcare time. The prediction for market time supports similar results in [Attanasio *et al.* \(2008\)](#) and [Jones *et al.* \(2015\)](#). However, [Attanasio *et al.*](#) also find a large role for decreased daycare costs. Our price of daycare experiments cast doubt on this latter finding since it predicts a substantial decline in primary childcare time – a decline that is not observed in U.S. time use surveys.

Fourth, the model predicted that changes in fertility show up chiefly through time spent on primary childcare and purchased daycare services.

Finally, the decline in the relative price of durables between the 1960s and early 2000s was predicted to increase market time and decrease housework time, a result reminiscent

of those in [Greenwood *et al.* \(2005\)](#). Under this scenario, the model predicted little change in primary childcare time; instead, households purchase more daycare services in order to satisfy their childcare constraint.

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